Promoting Transparency in Social Science Research BITSS ScholarsInterdisciplinarySocial Science
Edward Miguel Colin Camerer Kate Casey J. Cohen Kevin Esterling Alan Gerber Rachel Glennerster Donald P. Green Macartan Humphreys Guido Imbens Temina Madon Leif Nelson Brian Nosek Maya Petersen Richard Sedlmayr Joseph Simmons Mark van der Laan
There is a growing appreciation for the advantages of experimentation in the social sciences. Policy-relevant claims that in the past were backed by theoretical arguments and inconclusive correlations are now being investigated using more credible methods. Changes have been particularly pronounced in development economics, where hundreds of randomized trials have been carried out over the last decade. When experimentation is difficult or impossible, researchers are using quasi-experimental designs. Governments and advocacy groups display a growing appetite for evidence-based policy-making. In 2005, Mexico established an independent government agency to rigorously evaluate social programs, and in 2012, the U.S. Office of Management and Budget advised federal agencies to present evidence from randomized program evaluations in budget requests.
Accompanying these changes, however, is a growing sense that the incentives, norms, and institutions under which social science operates undermine gains from improved research design. Commentators point to a dysfunctional reward structure in which statistically significant, novel, and theoretically tidy results are published more easily than null, replication, or perplexing results. Social science journals do not mandate adherence to reporting standards or study registration, and few require data-sharing. In this context, researchers have incentives to analyze and present data to make them more “publishable,” even at the expense of accuracy. Researchers may select a subset of positive results from a larger study that overall shows mixed or null results or present exploratory results as if they were tests of prespecified analysis plans. These practices, coupled with limited accountability for researcher error, have the cumulative effect of producing a distorted body of evidence with too few null effects and many false-positives, exaggerating the effectiveness of programs and policies. Even if errors are eventually brought to light, the stakes remain high because policy decisions based on flawed research affect millions of people.
In this article, we survey recent progress toward research transparency in the social sciences and make the case for standards and practices that help realign scholarly incentives with scholarly values. We argue that emergent practices in medical trials provide a useful, but incomplete, model for the social sciences. New initiatives in social science seek to create norms that, in some cases, go beyond what is required of medical trials.